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 Introduction
Along with many other business schools, School of Economics at Göteborg University
has been critized for focusing research  and  teaching too much on large industrial
companies.
However, starting up the Master in International Management Program in the
recently formed Graduate Business School, we found that our knowledge of the recent
development of the large firms, particularly the multinational corporations, was
limited. In recent years, a large number of studies of public institutions, service and
knowledge enterprises, small firms and  non-profit organizations, almost all  directed
towards domestic operations, have been made but very few organizational studies of
large industrial companies and multinational corporations.
The shortage of research on multinational corporations should not, however, come as
a surprise. According to Ghoshal and  Westney (1993) organization  theory  and the
study of the MNC (multinational corporations) have not yet had a particularly close
relationship:
”With the possible exception of contingency theory, no paradigm from the major theories
about organizations and environments has had a major impact on the study of the
multinational enterprise, and no research on MNCs has drawn significant attention
from organization theorists.” (p. 1)
Since the purpose of the Master in International Management Program very much is
to prepare the students for a career in multinational corporations, this appears to be
a quite serious lack of knowledge. The natural way to remedy this lack is to see that
research is started within  this  area  and  that  this  research gets a long-range
character.
Consequently, within  the frame of GBS, a first  step in this direction is taken by
making a literature study  and  put together the most important results of the
research on the development of the structures and  strategies of the multinational
corporations.
Purpose
The purpose of this study is to map, illuminate and explain the recent development of
the strategies, structure and  control of multinational corporations.  The aim is to
identify crucial problems in managing and organizing multinational corporations and
describe what sort of approaches are used and proposed to solve these problems.
The first part of the project is an inventory and  critical examination of the recent
research on the strategies, structure and  control of multinational corporations. The
emphasis in the study is on research carried out in the last ten years. In this way a
knowledge base is created which can be used in teaching within GBS as well as basis
for further research.3
The Early Research on Multinational Corporations
The earliest studies of MNCs were strongly influenced by the economics  paradigm
with  the  focus on offshore manufacturing. In the first major research project on
multinational corporations at Harvard in the late 1960s, a multinational was defined
as a firm that had production facilities in several countries, a definition which became
standard in the early international management  literature (Ghoshal and  Westney,
1993).
The second stream of research on the MNC has its origin in the strategy–structure
paradigm. According to Bartlett and  Ghoshal (1993), the main contributors to the
theory of the classic M-form, the multidivisional organization, were Alfred Chandler
(1962) at MIT, Joseph Bower (1970) at Harvard Business School, and Richard Cyert
and James March (1963) at Carnegie Mellon.
The landmark studies within this paradigm, such as Perlmutter (1969), Stopford and
Wells (1972)  and  Franko (1976), typically focused on developing a classification of
MNC structures and on the problem of control of headquarters over national  sub-
sidiaries.
Structure follows strategy
It is obviously no overstatement to suggest that Chandler laid the foundation of the
modern international management research. In his  classical book ”Strategy and
Structure”, Chandler (1962) portrayed the multidivisional organization which emerged
in the 1920s and became the dominant corporate model in the 1960s. He distinguish-
ed four key  growth  strategies  and  showed  how each strategy caused specific
administrative inefficiencies and  therefore led to different organizational structures.
On the basis of a historical study of seventy of the largest companies in USA, Chand-
ler stated that:
1. Structure follows strategy
2. Strategies and structures develop in certain sequential stages
3. Organizations do not change their structures until provoked by inefficiencies
 The sequence in which organizations grow and develop starts with the creation of a
new strategy, continues with  the emergence of new administrative problems and
decline in financial performance and ends with the invention of a new organizational
structure and subsequent recovery of profits.
The  initial  growth  strategy was volume expansion creating a need  for an admi-
nistrative office; next strategy was geographic dispersion resulting in multiple field
units. The third strategy, vertical integration, led to a functional organization.
After passing through stages of volume expansion, geographic dispersion and vertical
integration,  companies  finally grew by product diversification, experienced ad-
minstrative problems within  the functional structure and  converted to the M-form,
the multidivisional structure, to regain profitability.4
Stopford and Wells’s international stages model
Chandler’s proposition that structure follows strategy was given strong support in the
first major study of multinational firms, in which Stopford and Wells (1972) concluded:
”We found that a close tie between strategy and structure exists regardless of what
industry the firm is in; managers in enterprises following similar  strategies in quite
different industries have developed similar organizational structures and ownership
policies.” (p. 5)
However, they did not believe unconditionally in a simple relationship where strategy
always and exclusively precedes structure; the reverse order is found too: ”Once set up,
the organizational  structure  almost  certainly influences the  choice of strategy of the
multinational firm.” (p. 5)
Their study of 187 American worldwide  companies  with  production in at least six
foreign countries resulted in a model showing that multinational corporations typically
adopt certain structures at different stages of international expansion. The principle
variables describing  the  stage of international expansion are (1) foreign  product
diversity, i.e. the degree of diversity among products sold abroad and (2) foreign sales
as percentage of total sales.
Fig: The International Stages Model, adapted from Stopford and
Wells (1972).
Initial stage: Most international firms go through an initial period with relatively auto-
nomous foreign subsidiaries which are tied to the parent company by loose financial
links in a way similar to a holding company.
Second stage: This unstructured system of subsidiaries can be tolerated for some time,
but if the subsidiaries grow rapidly and accumulate resources, pressures to increase

















set up an international division in which the foreign subsidiaries are brought together.
All foreign activities and international expertise are concentrated to this division.
Third stage: As the international division  increases in size,  pressures to increase
control rise again at the headquarters. Top managers recognize a need for a worldwide
perspective and, thus, a need for a global structure. When the foreign product diver-
sity increases, companies take on a worldwide product division structure. Firms that
expand foreign sales  without increasing product diversity typically adopt an area
division structure.
Final stage: When both foreign  sales  and foreign product diversity are high,  some
companies adopt a new structure, the global matrix or ”grid structure”.
The international stage model is descriptive, but was soon applied in a prescriptive
way by consultants and managers. In many cases, structure seemed to follow fashion
rather than strategy.
Franko: European multinationals do not follow the same pattern
A few years later Franko (1976)  made a study of the 85 largest industrial firms in
Continental Europe and found a pattern of development quite distinct from that found
by Stopford and  Wells. Instead of using  the international division  structure as an
intermediate form, most  European multinationals went directly from the parent-
subsidiary structure to a global product structure. In contrast to the American multi-
nationals, the European multinationals also maintained highly personalized relations
with their foreign subsidiaries throughout the growth and spread of their international
operations:
”Nevertheless, at the beginning of the 1970’s, the most important bonds between center
and periphery in European multinational systems were still the personal relationships
between presidents of parent companies and presidents of foreign ventures.” (p. 187)
This  personal nature of relationships between the parent company  and  the  sub-
sidiaries became known as the mother-daughter form of organization. By that time it
was the most common international organizational form in Continental Europe, used
by firms with many as well as few foreign production units.
American multinationals often used president-to-president relationships similar to the
mother-daughter form in early stages, but most of the firms abandoned this structure
before establishing their fifth foreign production unit (Stopford and Wells, 1972).
”The contrast could not be more complete between  the  management practices of the
Continental European multinationals using the  mother-daughter  form  and the
archetypical American multinational with job descriptions, ‘bibles’ of rules, and
frequent use of local nationals as foreign subsidiary presidents.” (Franko, 1976, p. 190)
In Franko’s words, the mother-daughter form was less a structure based on formal
rules  and  procedures than it was ”a structural surrogate based on career,  social,
friendship and family ties.” (p. 189) The European managers typically described their
organizations  using  analogies of Roman or feudal  control systems: ”Like Roman
proconsuls  sent out to govern the colonies after being educated as good Romans,6
subsidiary managers in many Continental firms were given foreign responsibilities only
after years spent absorbing the values and practices of the parent company.” (p. 190)
The socialization of the subsidiary managers was facilitated by the fact that many
were expatriates, often from families long-established in headquarters’ cities. Mostly,
formal control systems  were  seen as unnecessary, since headquarters managers
could usually predict how their subsidiary managers would act. Consequently, within
clear but unwritten  constraints,  subsidiary  managers were often granted a high
degree of autonomy. Some companies could achieve almost total worldwide standard-
ization of product, financing and personnel policies without any formal system.
”As long as constraints were respected and dividend checks appeared when anticipated,
the center rarely interfered with – or even asked for much information from – foreign
subsidiaries. When information was transferred, it often travelled on lines established
by friendship and acquaintance,  and in a manner showing little concern for the
principle of unity of command.” (p. 191)
There are several reasons for the lengthy use of the mother-daughter structure by
Continental multinationals, despite considerable geographical spread and  product
diversity. One partial explanation was the habit of European managers to spend all
their working life in one firm. A major reason was the separation of national markets
by trade barriers eliminating  most  possibilities of production specialization among
foreign subsidiaries and  thus  minimizing  the  need  for  cross-border communication
about delivery times, transfer prices and product specifications.
The European multinationals with the largest operations in the United States, such
as Philips and Ciba,  led  the change from the mother-daughter form to worldwide
structures. The reason for this order was the high level of competition in the American
market, forcing out structures  with  more efficient international  communication
channels.
Increasing competition in Europe in the late 1960’s  made more multinational
companies follow the route to worldwide  structures. In contrast to American multi-
nationals, the European firms typically avoided the international division stage, going
directly from the mother-daughter form to a ”supranational” or worldwide structure.
However, this change occurred only after having achieved a large geographical spread
of international production.
A similar pattern was observed in Scandinavia, where the multinationals retained the
mother-daughter structure until the 1970’s and then went straight to the worldwide
product structure (Hedlund and Åman, 1984).7
Perlmutter’s classification of multinationals
One of the classical articles, influencing the international management research for
decades, is ”The Tortuous Evolution of the Multinational  Corporation” by Howard
Perlmutter (1969). In particular, his work builds a bridge between the early research
and the ”process school” (see e.g.,Hedlund, 1986).
In contrast to most theories in the international field,  Perlmutter’s typology of
multinational  corporations is based on managerial attitudes. He identified three
primary attitudes, or states of mind,  toward  building a multinational firm among
international executives:
• The ethnocentric or home-country attitude
• The polycentric or host-country attitude
• The geocentric or world-oriented attitude
These attitudes never appear in pure form; there is some degree of ethnocentricity,
polycentricity or geocentricity in all firms.
In ethnocentric firms, policies, standards and performance criteria are deveoped at the
headquarters and applied everywhere in the world.  The  communication process is
dominated by a flow of orders and advice from the headquarters to the subsidiaries.
For key positions,  all  over the world,  people of home nationality are selected and
trained; foreigners do not count.
In  polycentric firms, it is assumed that host-country cultures are  different and
foreigners difficult to understand. Consequently, subsidiaries should adapt to the host-
country conditions and establish an as local as possible identity. Like confederations,
polycentric firms are loosely connected groups of quasi-independent entities, typically
held together by financial control systems. For a long time, European multinationals
frequently used the the polycentric model, selecting a strong,  trustworthy  local
national of the ”right” family as subsidary manager.
At headquarters in polycentric firms, it is assumed that standards and  performance
criteria must be different in different countries and  adapted to local conditions. The
subsidiaries are assigned a high level of autonomy, as long as profits are satisfactory.
The  flow of information  between headquarters and  subsidiaries  and  between
subsidiaries is low, and local managers can not expect to advance to senior positions
at headquarters.
In geocentric firms, beginning to emerge at an accelerating rate, the subsidiaries are
neither satellites nor autonomous actors, ”but parts of a whole  whose  focus is on
worldwide  objectives as well as local  objectives, each part making its unique
contribution with its unique competence.” (1969 p. 13)
Aiming for a worldwide approach in both headquarters and subsidiaries, the geocentric
firm attempts to build an organization where the subsidiaries are not only good
citizens but also leading exporters of the host country, contributing to benefits such
as increased hard currency, new skills and advanced technology. Subsidiary managers
should ask themselves where in the world they could get the best assistence serving
the customers of their country and  where in the world  products  developed in their
country could be sold.8
Superiority is not equated with nationality – the best  men are sought, regardless of
nationality, to solve problems anywhere in the world.  Headquarters and  subsidiaries
cooperate to establish universal standards and  performance criteria, at the same
time allowing  local variations. There is a high  flow of informations in all  directions,
between headquarters and subsidiaries and between subsidiaries.
As most important external  forces  toward  geocentrism Perlmutter mentions the
growing world markets, increasing availability of managerial and technological know-
how in different countries, global competition and international customers, advances
in telecommunications and regional political and economic communities.
Important forces within  firms are increasing desire to use human and  material
resources optimally, lowering of morale owing to ethnocentric practices, waste and
duplication of resources due to polycentric thinking, increased awareness of qualified
people of other than the home nationality and, in particular, top management’s
commitment to building a geocentric company.9
Porter: Patterns of International Competition
In his article ”Changing Patterns of International Competition”, Michael  Porter
(1986) presents his Configuration/Coordination framework, ”one of the two dominant
models of international strategy  developed in the 80’s” (Taggart, 1998 p. 24) – the
other one being the Integration-Responsiveness grid by Prahalad and Doz (1987).
The article is focused on the connectedness among country competition – how a firm’s
activities in one country affect or are affected by activities in other countries. The
question Porter seeks an answer to is what particular issues international competi-
tion in contrast to domestic raise for competitive strategies.
The  pattern of international  competition differs significantly from industry to in-
dustry, ranging from multidomestic industries in which competition in one country is
independent of competition in other countries to global industries in which competition
in one country is affected by competition in other countries.
Multidomestic industries are present in many countries but the competition takes
place on a country-by-country basis, such as in retailing, consumer packaged goods
and insurance. In these industries, companies may draw on a competitive advantage
resulting from a single transfer of knowledge developed in the home country. However,
since the intangible assets  are modified and adapted according to the conditions in
each country, the  competitive advantage of a company is often specific to each
country.
In a multidomestic industry, the firm’s strategy should be adapted to the local
conditions of the country; this is what Porter calls a ”country-centred strategy”. The
international  activities should be managed like a portfolio, where  each subsidiary
should be granted a high degree of autonomy and control all activities necessary to do
business in the industry. The important competitors are either domestic companies or
multinationals competing on a country-by-country basis.
Global industries, such as airlines, copiers and  automobiles, consist of a number of
connected domestic industries in which the companies compete against each other on
a worldwide basis. To achieve competitive advantage, firms  must in some way
integrate its activities on a worldwide basis.
Firms competing in global industries must decide how to spread the different activities
in their value chain among countries. Downstream activities, such as marketing,
sales and service, are usually tied to the location of the customers. This means that
competitive advantages created in downstream activities are often country-specific,
such as reputation,  brand  name  and  service  network. In these circumstances, a
multidomestic pattern of competition usually develops.
Upstream  and  support activities, such as operations and  technology development,
are easier to separate  from  where  the  customers  are located. Competitive
advantages in these parts of the value chain often derive from the whole system of
countries in which  the  company is active. Consequently, in this case  global
competition is more common.10
Porter classifies the ways in which firms compete  internationally by means of two
dimensions:
• The configuration of a firm’s activities worldwide – where in the world  and in how
many places each activity in the  vaue  chain is performed, ranging  from
concentrated (performing an activity in one country and serving the world from it)
to dispersed (performing every activity in each country).
• The coordination of a firm’s activities worldwide – how similar activities in 
different countries are coordinated with each other, ranging from none to 
very high.
Regarding production, for example, the most important configuration issue is where
and in how many places components and end products are manufactured. The
coordination issue deals with to which degree different plants are coordinated by using
the same technology, the same materials and the same information system.
Fig:  Types of international strategies (Porter, 1986, p. 19).
Thus, a firm in which the configuration of activities is geographically dispersed and the
level of coordination is low  pursues a country-centred strategy. This means that in
every country, in which the firm is operating, there is an entire value chain. The
extreme case is the domestic firm operating only in one country. Moving diagonally


























The opposite strategy, a purest global strategy, is pursued by a firm with a geo-
graphically concentrated configuration and a high level of coordination. This means
that the firm seeks to concentrate as many activities as possible in one  country,
serve the world from this base  and  tightly coordinate those activities that must be
performed close to the market.
Consequently, there is no such thing as one global strategy. Porter defines the global
strategy of a firm as a choice of a certain combination of configuration and
coordination of its international activities:
”A global strategy can now be defined more precisely as one in which a firm seeks to
gain competitive advantage from its international presence through either concentrating
configuration, coordination among dispersed activities, or both.” (1986, p. 20)
Porter emphasizes that international strategy is not a simple choice between global
integration  and  local  responsiveness.  There are many possible combinations of
configuration and  coordination of the activities  throughout the value chain; a firm
may standardize (or concentrate) certain activities while tailoring (or dispersing)
others at the same time.
The balancing of configuration and  coordination  varies over time. Concentrating
activities has become less necessary  for economic reasons and  less possible due to
increased demands from governments for dispersion. The possibilities of global coordi-
nation has increased dramatically through modern technology. At the same time, the
need  for coordination increases to reconcile greater dispersion  and to respond to
customer needs. Porter states that today (1986) global strategy seems increasingly
to be matter of coordination; production and R&D becoming more and more dispersed
and greater need for coordinating marketing activitivites worldwide.12
The Process School:  Toward a New Managerial Theory of the
Multinational Firm?
Dominating  the international management arena since the  middle of the  1980s,
Christopher Bartlett, Sumantra  Ghoshal,  Yves  Doz, C. K. Prahalad and  Gunnar
Hedlund,  scholars of the ‘process  school’, not only maintain having discovered the
emergence of a new organizational model but also claim having contributed to a new
paradigm  and a new managerial  theory of the multinational firm (Bartlett and
Ghoshal, 1993;  Doz and Prahalad, 1991;  Hedlund and Rolander, 1990).
Common denominators of the ‘process  school’ are the mistrust of unidimensional
structures, the search for flexible solutions, a preference for cultural control and the
recommendation of more subtle coordination mechanisms (Schütte, 1998). According
to Ghoshal and  Bartlett (1995), the traditional strategy-structure-systems  doctrine
should be replaced by a ‘purpose-process-people doctrine’.
ABB – the corporate model of the next century?
In an article in the exclusive Mastering Management series of Financial  Times,
leading  multinational  researchers  Christopher  Bartlett  and  Sumantra  Ghoshal
compare Percy Barnevik of ABB to Halley’s  comet  and claim that he should be
recognized as having invented a new corporate form,
”...a fundamentally different model of how a large  company  can be organized and
managed, just as Sloan did 75 years ago. There is something special about 75 years.
That is approximately how long time it takes for Halley’s comet to return for its next
visit to the earth’s atmosphere.” (Mastering Management, February 5, 1998)
In their article ”Beyond the M-form: Toward a Managerial Theory of the Firm”, Bart-
lett and  Ghoshal (1993)  describe this new organizational model, using ABB as an
illustration, as representing a radically new structural philosophy, based on ”a
principle of proliferation and subsequent aggregation of small independent  entrepre-
neurial  units from the bottom  up,  rather than one of division and devolution of
resources and responsibilities from the top.”
According to Bartlett  and  Ghoshal (1989),  large  MNCs  are converging toward a
common configuration, in which increasingly specialized units worldwide  are  linked
into an integrated network enabling  them to simultaneously achieve strategic
objectives of efficiency, responsiveness, and  innovation.  They  call this new
organizational model the transnational corporation.
Parallel to the transnational corporation, several similar models have emerged, such
as the multifocal corporation (Doz, 1986;  Prahalad and  Doz,  1987),  the heterarchy
(Hedlund, 1986;  Hedlund and Rolander, 1990), the horizontal organization (White and
Poynter, 1990)  and  the multi-center firm (Forsgren, 1990;  Forsgren and  Johanson,
1992).
These approaches share the general view that multinational structures are becoming
less hierarchical. The underlying organizational form of these models varies but seems
to share elements of formal and informal matrix management. ”The less-hierarchical
MNC operates like a network, beyond the constraints of formal, bureaucratic structures.13
Under such a structure, subsidiary  units are highly differentiated and functionally
interdependent, which results in complex flows of products, people  and  information.”
(Marschan, 1997)
While geographically very dispersed, the subsidiary units are coordinated and con-
trolled particularly  through informal mechanisms, such as organizational culture,
interlocking board of directors  and  personal relationships (Hedlund and Rolander,
1990;  Marschan, 1997).
Whether multinationals are in fact  moving towards this model is currently  being
debated; all scholars within  the fields of organization theory and  international man-
agement do not agree with Bartlett and Ghoshal. Among others, Swedish researchers
Melin (1992), Forsgren (1992) and Berggren (1996) question their conception of a new
emerging model with ABB as a prime example.
According to Melin (1992), the new models require an extremely skillful and powerful
top management being  able to control all  internal  forces in a large  worldwide
corporation. To unite  the  dispersed  MNCs by means of cultural control, a rather
monolithic culture seems to be necessary. The underlying assumptions of culture as a
variable that can be controlled from the top of the organization are questioned by
many students of organizational culture, e.g., Smircich (1983) and Alvesson and Berg
(1992).
Balancing responsiveness and integration: multifocal strategy and organization
Within the ‘process school’, the first large research projects were carried out by Yves
Doz and C. K. Prahalad (Doz, 1986;  Prahalad and Doz, 1987). Starting in 1974, the
project comprised over ten years of in-depth research in more than twenty United
States-based, European, and Japanese multinationals.
Six major industries, all  exposed to intense economic and competitive pressures for
international integration, were analyzed in detail: automobiles, trucks, microelectro-
nics, data processing equipment, telecommunications systems  and  heavy  electrical
engineering. The purpose of the studies was to describe the strategic choices open to
multinational companies facing tensions between national responsiveness and global
integration, to provide a managerial understanding of the  strategic choices and to









In ”The Multinational Mission”, Prahalad and Doz (1987) introduce a framework defin-
ing the main conflicting forces that affect the strategy of a business. First, firms have
to cope with  the demands imposed by economic imperatives, such as technology,
economies of scale, factor advantages, and global distribution. Second, competition is
distorted by the intervention of host and  home governments, i.e.  the  political
imperative. Third, the ability of the organization to reallocate resources and adapt to
new competitive conditions is labelled the organizational imperative.
Until the 1960s, competitive pressures were mild and national markets protected by
tariff barriers; a majority of the multinational  companies  pursued a strategy of
national  responsiveness. Important competitive advantages were unique  intangible
assets provided to subsidiaries by their mother companies, such as new technology
and knowhow not easily available to the local firms (Doz, 1986).
National responsiveness allows the subsidiaries to behave almost as if they were
national companies; headquarters seldom intervene in the decision making process of
the subsidiaries. Typically, subsidiaries manufacture a relatively  complete product
range in each country, thereby minimizing intersubsidiary trade.
However, national responsiveness does not eliminate the need  for headquarter
coordination; certain functions, e.g., financing, R&D, export sales, pricing, purchasing,
process engineering and marketing often require central coordination. The success of
multinationals over national competitors is based on the ability to exploit common ca-
pabilities and knowhow and to coordinate competitive actions across boundaries.
Over time, increasing transfer of technology and other kinds of knowledge weakened
competitive advantages based on intangible assets and contributed to the emergence
of strong global competitors, particularly in Japan. At the same  time trade
liberalization  removed the tariff barriers protecting most  national  markets and
exposed national industries to renewed international competition. Facing this new
global competition, large multinational companies often adopted an integration
strategy, by which manufacturing costs were reduced by means of specialization.
Doz (1986)  defines global integration as the specialization of plants across  borders
into an integrated multinational production and  distribution network. Instead of
producing  complete  product ranges for each national market, the multinational
manufactures in each country only part of a common product range, but for the global
market. Since key decisions affecting operations in one country also directly affect
operations in other countries, integration  strategies result in centralized
management.
Towards the end of the  1970s,  further trade liberalization and lower growth or
maturing demand in many  industries increased the tension between national
responsiveness and global integration. According to Doz (1986), the choice between
national responsiveness and global integration can seldom be mutually exclusive. The
three  most important factors influencing  the choice of increasing either global
integration or national responsiveness of a particular multinational business are
underlying  economic  and  technical characteristics of the business, host country
conditions and government policies and the competitive position.15
Some firms avoid choosing between national responsiveness and global integration.
By selecting a multifocal strategy they try to combine elements of both strategies in
an ad hoc way. According to Doz (1986), multifocal strategies try to offer something
for everyone. They are ambiguous, sometimes exploiting opportunities for integration,
sometimes leaving complete autonomy to the subsidiaries.
Prahalad and Doz (1987)  introduced ”The Integration-Responsiveness grid”  showing
how pressures for strategic coordination and global integration and pressures for local
responsiveness affect the choice of strategy and organization. Pressures for strategic
coordination and global integration derive from:
• Importance of multinational customers
• Presence of multinational competitors
• Investment intensity
• Technology intensity
• Pressure for cost reduction
• Universal needs
• Access to raw materials and energy
And pressures for local responsiveness arise from:
• Differences in customer needs
• Differences in distribution channels
• Availability of substitutes and the need to adapt
• Market structure
• Host government demands
Fig:  The Integration-Responsiveness grid: Strategic focus
















According to Prahalad and Doz (1987), managers cannot make a ”one-time choice” of
one of the two dimensions. At the  same  time,  they must pay attention to issues
requiring global integration as well as local responsiveness. This need for simultaneous
integration and responsiveness also must be reflected in the way of organizing the
business; a multifocal organization is required.
The ideal multifocal organization is not bound by contraints imposed by the formal
structure. While the formal structure and systems constitute the skeleton, the ”flesh
and blood” and the ”mind” of the organization are supplied by the principles governing
the process of management and conflict resolution. These principles are characterized
by a pluralism that allows multiple perspectives  and  differences of opinons, a fluid
power structure that allows the ”existing logic” and ”current wisdom” to be challenged
and a certain discipline in the organization.
Strategic control is exercised by means of subprocesses of change and a collection of
management tools. The subprocesses of change have three dimensions: cognitive
perspective, strategic priorities and  power allocation. The management tools are of
three kinds. The data management tools provide information for critical decisions. The
managers’ ‘management tools’ express the rules of the game shaping perceptions and
expectations. The conflict resolution tools are used for managing the trade-off between
priorities of global integration and national responsiveness.
Managing across Borders: Multinational Responses to New Pressures
The findings of Bartlett and Ghoshal (1987a;  1989;  1993) draw on two empirical five-
year research projects, the first starting in 1984  and  the second in the end of the
1980’s. Both projects included  case  studies of American, European and  Asian
multinationals. The point of departure for the first study of Bartlett and  Ghoshal
(1989) was the question: How did multinational corporations respond to the new
pressures that the changing dynamics of the competition in the 1980s brought about?
According to Bartlett and  Ghoshal (1987b;  1989), most multinational corporations
entered the 1980s  not  being properly prepared to respond to the new strategic
challenges that changes in the business environment had created. In particular, the
changes produced three kinds of forces exerting pressures on the companies:
• Forces for local differentiation created a need for increased responsiveness
• Forces for global integration created a need for increased efficiency
• Forces for worldwide innovation created a need for increased learning
Obviously, their point of departure is very similar to that of Doz (1986) and Prahalad
and Doz (1987), adding a third force to national responsiveness and global integration.
To examine the multinational responses to these challenges, Bartlett and  Ghoshal
studied nine worldwide American, European and Asian companies in three industries:
consumer electronics, branded packaged goods and  telecommunications. They found
that, even within particular industries, global companies had developed very different
strategic responses to changes in their environment. The nine companies used three
different approaches corresponding to the three different  forces  the international
business environment:17
•   Responsiveness.  Other  companies, such as Unilever  and Philips, developed the
capability of being very sensitive and responsive to national differences which help
them to build strong local presence. These are called multinational companies.
•   Global efficiency.  Some companies, especially the  Japanese  ones,  developed a
capability of global efficiency. They created cost advantages by centralizing their
international operations. These are labeled global companies.
•   Transfer of knowledge.The third group of companies, such as Proctor & Gamble and
Ericsson, developed the capability of transferring  parent company knowledge to
subsidiaries and  adapting it to foreign markets. These are  labeled  international
companies.
The prescription was based on the idea of fit, i. e., a company should identify the key
success factor of the industry and then develop certain capabilities to achieve the
right fit. So, in many global industries either responsiveness, efficiency, or knowledge
transfer was considered the key success factor, and  management's task was to
develop the corresponding capability to achieve a fit between the dominant strategic
requirement of the industry and the organizational capability.
In the consumer electronics industry efficiency was considered the dominant strategic
requirement. Matsushita had developed the corresponding capability; Philips and GE
had  not. In branded  packaged products responsiveness was seen as the success
factor. Unilever had developed this capability; Kao and Proctor & Gamble had not. In
telecommunications it was transfer of knowledge that counted. Ericsson had a fit; ITT
and NEC had not.
This focus on just one of these capabilities became a problem in the mid  80s. To be
successful, a company now had to develop all three capabilities simultaneously. To be
able to do this, companies had to get away from the traditional management methods
and take on a new organizational  model – the transnational model.  According to
Bartlett and  Ghoshal, this is not a specific strategy or organizational form – the
transnational is a new management mentality.
A generation of managers believed there was a structural solution to every major
strategic problem. To cope with the increasing change and  complexity of the 1980s,
many corporations chose to restructure, and the solution was there: the global matrix.
The matrix should make it possible to balance centralized efficiency and local respon-
siveness, stimulate multiple perspectives and increase the flexibility.
However, most companies had difficulties with the matrix. Differences in perspectives
and interests were reinforced. Even very small differences could cause disagreements
and conflicts. There was a lot of communication, discussions and meetings. The result
was slow and time-consuming decision-making processes. But the basic problem was
that companies, in their  search  for fit, focused on just one  thing – the formal
structure. To be competitive, companies had to go beyond structure and expand other
organizational capabilities.
In the mid  80's major changes occurred in these industries. The dominance of one
strategic demand was replaced by a much more complex set of demands. Companies
now had to respond simultaneously to several, often conflicting demands. Now, the
task of the manager was not to develop a strategic capability to fit  the dominant
industry requirement – it was to build multiple sources of competitive advantages
that could be managed in a flexible way.18
A company's ability to build new strategic capabilities depends on the existing assets
and capabilities that it has built up over a long period of time. And these attributes,
referred to as the administrative heritage, are not easily changed. The way a company
can respond to the changes in the environment is constrained by the internal
capabilities which are shaped by the administrative heritage. So, companies have to
understand the nature of their administrative heritage and  develop capabilities that
are consistent with their heritage.
The influence of a nation's history, culture and infrastructure is very evident in many
British companies. According to Alfred Chandler, most large British companies were
dominated by "family capitalism" up to World  War II. When  these companies
expanded internationally, family members or other loyal company servants were sent
to take care of the foreign subsidiaries. In Unilever the subsidiaries were controlled by
an inner circle of trusted managers who reported directly to William  Lever, the
founder. In Philips, the Philips family dominated the company up to the 40s, and the
foreign subsidiaries were managed by a group known as the "Dutch Mafia".
The administrative heritage also influences the organizational structure, capabilities
and  management  mentalities. This influence is reflected in the three models: the
multinational, the global and the international.
The Multinational model was adopted by companies expanding in the prewar period.
The configuration can be described as a decentralized federation. The structure fits
well with the informal management style family ownership often is associated with.
Top management controls the foreign  subsidiaries through their personal rela-
tionships with the subsidiary managers. The financial control systems  are  quite
simple and do not check everything in detail. The multinational management menta-
lity regards the foreign operations as a portfolio of independent businesses. Each unit
should adapt its strategy and operations to the local business environment.
The Global model was one of the earliest corporate structures. Henry Ford used this
model for his massproduction of cars sold all  over the world by a very  centralized
organization. The global model can be described as a centralized hub. The role of the
local subsidiaries is to assemble and sell products. They are not supposed to develop
new products or strategies, not even to modify existing ones. There is a tight central
control of decisions, resources and information.
This model particularly suited the Japanese companies, since it was difficult for them
to transfer their special management style to the foreign subsidiaries. Managers in
global companies focus more on world markets than managers in multinational and
international companies, but they regard them as a single integrated market where
similarities are more important than differences.
The International model came into use after the World wars. To these companies it
was important to transfer knowledge and expertise to their foreign subsidiaries. The
subsidiaries in international companies may adapt products and  strategies to the
local environment, but they are more coordinated and controlled by headquarters than
subsidiaries in multinational firms. The configuration can be described as a coordina-
ted federation.19
This is a structure that fit  American companies particularly  well.  They  had pro-
fessional managers at the headquarters who were able to delegate  quite a deal of
responsibility to the subsidiaries while at the same  time control them by means of
sophisticated  financial  systems  and  controllers. The international management
mentality regards the foreign subsidiaries as appendages to the parent company.
The Transnational – the Emerging Organizational Model?
Bartlett and Ghoshal (1987b;  1989) state that managers in most worldwide corpo-
rations by now realized that they had to combine the  strategic capabilities of the
three models. They must at the  same  time be responsive to local differences, be
globally efficient and be able to transfer knowledge.The  three models represent
different strategic capabilities but also different strategic dilemmas:
•   The multinational model's strength is the ability to respond to local market needs.
The dilemma of the model is that the decentralization and independent behavior of
the subsidiaries counteract global efficiency. The transfer of knowledge also suffers
from the decentralization; the subsidiaries develop their own knowledge and  have
little interest in sharing it with other units or learning from each other.
•   The  global model's strength is global scale efficiency. The dilemma is that the
subsidiaries are stripped down and carry limited resources, which make it difficult
to respond to local market needs. The knowledge development is centralized to the
parent company and very little is transferred to the subsidiaries.
•   The international model is the ability to transfer  knowledge and skills from the
parent company and  adapt them to local needs. The dilemma is that it is less
responsive than the multinational model and less efficient than the global model.
The  transnational company has overcome these contradictions.  The  problem is
defined in another way:
• Local responsivess is important, but mainly for achieving flexibility in 
international operations
• Efficiency is important, not for its own sake, but for achieving competiveness
in global operations
• Knowledge development and transfer is important, but it is seen in the 
broader perspective of organizational learning including all members of the 
company
The multinational company is decentralized, the global company is centralized and
the international company is something in between the two of them. Instead of either
centralizing or decentralizing assets,  the transnational company makes selective
centralization and decentralization.
• Certain resources are centralized at the parent company because of scale 
advantages or to protect core competences such as basic research. Other 
typical areas of centralization are the treasury function and international 
management development.
• Other resources are also centralized, not at the parent company but at one of 
the subsidiaries. Labor-intensive production may be concentrated to a low-
wage country such as Portugal or Mexico. Development and production of 
high-tech components may be located to Japan or Germany.20
• Other resources are decentralized on a local-for-local basis because of the
benefits of differentiation and flexibility. Decentralization of critical resources may
protect against exchange rate shifts, strikes etc.
Most companies in the Bartlett and Ghoshal study (1989) were converging toward a
common configuration, an integrated network, that enabled them to simultaneously
achieve their strategic objectives of efficiency, responsiveness, and  innovation. The
strength of this configuration is based on three main  characteristics: dispersion,
specialization, and interdependence.
The dispersed configuration allows worldwide  companies to sense new consumer
trends, technological advances, and competitive actions which nowadays can emerge
anywhere in the world.  The dispersion not only give these firms access to low-cost
labor and  materials but also access to an international pool of increasingly scarce
technological and managerial resources.
By means of specialized operations, transnationals are in a better position to take
advantage of new flexible manufacturing technologies and  split up the increasingly
complex R&D task into focused research areas in different  places.  Interdependent
relationships  create  the  necessary  conditions for ther collaborative information
sharing  and  problem  solving, cooperative resource sharing,  and  collective
implementation that today’s worldwide competitive environment demands.
Transnational companies must respond in a complex way – the customers require
differentiated products but at the same  low  price as standard products. And the
responses have to be adapted to frequent changes in tastes, technologies and regula-
tions. A major barrier to the flexibility a worldwide  company  requires  today is the
uniform  treatment of subsidiaries. It locks management  into simplistic and  often
dichotomous choices and prevents more subtle options.
To be able to respond to a rapidly changing world,  the transnational creates a
multinational flexibility in many ways. The most important means for achieving this
flexibility is differentiation – the  task of building  specialization  into  the roles and
responsibilities of national subsidiaries.
In some markets standard global products are accepted, and the role of the subsidiary
is limited to implementation of central  decisions. In other markets customers are
more sophisticated, competitors are more active,  and  technologies are more
advanced. Instead of treating all subsidiaries equally, transnational managers adapt
the roles and  responsibilities of the subsidiaries to the strategic importance of the
local environments.
However, it is not only a matter of adapting subsidiaries to particular local environ-
ments. Subsidiaries showing the capacity of creative marketing, flexible manufact-
uring, or innovative development should be used for the benefit of the entire organiza-
tion.
The research of Bartlett and  Ghoshal (1989)  does not reveal any clear role assign-
ment among subsidiaries  but ”suggests a vague but consistent pattern...” This
pattern indicates four generic roles that national subsidiaries can play in a trans-
national organization:21
•   Strategic Leader. Subsidiaries with  high  competence  located in strategically
important markets become legitimate  partners  with  the headquarters in
developing and implementing strategies.
•   Contributor: Subsidiaries with high competence but located in a less strategically
important market utilize the benefits of certain local facilities or capabilities and
apply them to worldwide operations.
•   Implementer: Subsidiaries with  just  enough  competence to maintain  their  local
operations in a nonstrategic market maintain the commercial  viability of the
company  and  generate resources supporting  strategic processes. In most
companies, the majority of subsidiaries play this role.
•   The black hole: Subsidiaries located in strategically important markets should be
playing the role of a strategic leader but lacks the competence to do so. The black
hole is not an acceptable strategic position, but remedies will not come cheap.
Differentiation in subsidiaries' roles is only one part of a broader system of internal
differentiation.  Businesses, products, and  functions are all  managed differently,
according to national cultures, industry structures  and competitive  positions. This
system of internal differentiation requires a different management mentality to work
– a transnational mentality .
Managers  with a transnational mentality recognize that  different  parts of the
company possess different capabilities and make use of that. Innovations are created
both centrally and locally. In many cases central resources are pooled with resources
of several subsidiaries to develop a worldwide product. Subsidiaries become strategic
partners whose knowledge and capabilities are vital to the whole corporation.
Transnational managers recognize that the key capability is worldwide learning, the
ability to sense new trends, to respond innovatively, and to diffuse the innovations to
all parts of the company. Worldwide learning requires that the company makes use of
all possible ways to develop innovative products and  processes.  The complexity and
diversity of the transnational structure can lead to fragmentation and disintegration.
To make this organization function, management must do a great deal of integration
work:
• First, they must find a way to balance and legitimize the multiple perspec-
tives and capabilities
• Second, to manage the complexity of differentiated roles and responsibilities, 
they have develop flexible coordination processes
• Third, they must create a shared vision and build commitment into the 
organization – create a matrix in the managers' minds
Beyond the M-form?
In their second study of multinationals,  Bartlett  and  Ghoshal  (1993) focus the
research on identifying emerging organizational forms and  their logics. The point of
departure is very much the same as in the first study; radical changes in the business
environment  have put a pressure on multinational  companies to create new
organizational models.22
 The changes are described in quite dramatic terms. After a period of refinement and
incremental progress, new environmental demands in the early 1990s ”were driving
changes in strategy, structure, and management that were probably as widespread and
impactful as the  diversification/divisionalization  changes that drove the post-War
managerial revolution.” (1993, p. 24).
To understand these changes and identify emerging organizational forms, Bartlett and
Ghoshal studied 18 worldwide American, European and Asian companies in complex
and  dynamic businesses that were  attempting more radical  changes,  including
Swedish  firms such as ABB, IKEA and  Electrolux.  Their findings suggest  that
multinational  corporations are creating a new organizational form, significantly
different from the traditional M-form structure.
Bartlett and Ghoshal believe that the management of ABB and other companies they
have studied is based on assumptions about organization, decision making and human
behavior that are significantly different  from those underlying  academic theories
within  the business area, causing a widening  gap between existing  management
theory and emerging management practice.
In the SMJ article ”Beyond the M-form: Toward a Managerial Theory of the Firm”
(1993), Bartlett and Ghoshal examine the organizational character of ABB, ”...often
cited as a prime example of of the emerging corporate form...”, from the three
perspectives of Chandler (1962),  Bower  (1970)  and  Cyert  and March (1963). The
purpose is to contrast ABB with:
•   Chandler’s structural description to distinguish the entrepreneurial process of ABB
from that of the M-form
•   Bower’s strategic process  model to show the difference between the horizontal
integration process of ABB and the vertical information process of the M-form
•   the behavioral theory of Cyert and March to show how the macrolevel goal-setting
and learning mechanisms of ABB complement the microlevel processes in the M-
form
The new model presented in the article describes the operations of ABB as seen by its
managers and in terms of their roles and tasks. The structure of the organization is
defined in terms of three core positons and  three core processes. The core positions
are the front-line, middle and top-level managers and the roles, behaviors and actions
associated  with  them.  The  management core processes, each of them structured
around the three core positions, are:
• The entrepreneurial process, aligning and supporting initiatives
• The integration process, linking and leveraging capabilities
• The renewal process, creating purpose and challenge
According to Bartlett  and  Ghoshal,  Barnevik’s primary objective for changing the
multidivisional structure he inherited was to create an organization which allowed a
much wider  distribution of entrepreneurial activities.  The  management  roles were
redefined to produce an entrepreneurial process, very different from that of the classic
M-form.23
Fig: The entrepreneurial process.
The front-line managers, in ABB represented by the heads of the 1.300  operating
companies, are the key drivers of the entrepreneurial process. They have left their
traditional roles of operational implementors of top-down decisions and  become the
primary entrepreneurial actors of the company. Each front-line company in ABB is
given substantial financial independence by being entitled to retain a third of its net
profits and manage its own treasury function,
The middle-level managers, in ABB represented by the business area managers, are
no longer acting as controlling supervisors. Instead they have become the foremost
supporters  and  coaches of front-line  managers. Top management is driving the
entrepreneurial  process in the first place by setting broad  sets of objectives and
stretched performance standards for front-line activities.
The top management role in the entrepreneurial process is exemplified by the group
executive of Power  transmission, at that time Göran Lindahl. He was  building a
shared commitment to the ambition of ”conquering the globe in power transmission”,
expecting his business area  and  company managers to develop corresponding
business strategies. At the same time Lindahl worked in direct contact with front-line
managers, practising a style he called ”fingers in the pie management” in contrast to
”abstract management”, remote control by means of sophisticated report systems.
 Fig: The integration process
In companies such as ABB, vital specialized knowledge and expertise are spread out
through the organization, creating a strong need for a horizontal integration process
enabling  the  entire organization to benefit from the specialized resources and
expertise developed in the front-line companies.
In this integration process, middle management plays the key role, driving the process




























To release capacity for managing such horizontal linkages, the demands of vertical
communication on the middle managers are reduced by means of formal information
systems, intensive informal communication and  commitment to system-wide infor-
mation sharing.
The  linkage role of middle  management is sustained by top management’s deve-
lopment of corporate values and  norms supporting and rewarding collaborative be-
havior. In ABB, top management makes great effort to create a shared corporate
identity facilitating the transfer of specialized  knowledge and expertise. The first
values described in 21-page ”policy bible” is listed as ”Corporate Unity”.
The continued communication of values and  norms create an environment
encouraging the front-line managers to use the horizontal linkages for building and
exploiting  operational interdependencies and  personal networks. In this way
specialized  knowledge and expertise are transferred across company and  country
boundaries and spread out through the organization.
Fig: The renewal process
While the front-line managers are the main actors in the entrepreneurial process and
middle  management is driving  the integration process, it is top management that
plays  the key role in the  renewal  process by shaping  and embedding corporate
purpose.
ABB corporate purpose is ”to contribute to environmentally sound sustainable growth
and make improved living standards a reality for all nations around the world.” This
broadly expressed purpose is then translated into  the more specific objective  ”to
increase the value of our products based on continuous technological innovation and on
the competence and motivation of our employees... becoming a global leader – the most
competitive, competent, technologically advanced and  quality  minded electrical
engineering company in our fields of activity.” The objective is further operationalized
in financial peformance terms – 10 percent operating profit and 25 percent return on
capital employed.
In the front-line  companies,  tension arises when  managers face the gap between
short-term performance and  the long-term ambition indicated in the purpose
statement.  This tension will  not be resolved without a high level of credibility and
trust; consequently, the key task in the renewal process for middle management is to














Over time, the roles of ABB’s group  executives have changed and become  quite
different from the classic responsibilities of leadership in the M-form organization:
”From being formulators of corporate strategy, they have become  the  shapers of an
institutional purpose with which all employees  can identify and to which they can
commit.  Instead of being the  architects of formal  structure, they have come to see
themselves as the developers of organizational  processes that can capture individual
initiative and create supporting relationships. And, rather than being the designers of
systems, they have refocused on the individual as the primary unit of analysis in the
leadership task and have become the molders of people.” (Bartlett and Ghoshal, 1993 p.
40)
According to Bartlett and Ghoshal, managers in ABB and most other companies they
studied see large organizations not only as economic  entities  but also as complex
social institutions: ”These managers are replacing the hard-edged strategy-structure-
systems  paradigm of the M-form with a softer, more organic model built around
purpose, process and people.”
Bartlett and Ghoshal criticize organizational theory for being ”increasingly dominated
by a remote, reified and pessimistic view of large organizations”. They refer to
population ecology and transaction cost analysis as being remote, population ecology
as being overly deterministic, institutional  theory as substituting isomorphism for
leadership,  behavioral theory of the firm as denying purpose  and  direction and
organizational economics as making assumptions about shirking, opportunism and
inertia.
In contrast, the new model is grounded in a managerial  perspective that is very
different from that of existing economic and behavioral theories of the firm. ”It is this
managerial perspective that we would like to see legitimated in a new theory of the firm
that would focus on the distinctive characteristics of large business organizations and
illuminate issues that managers of such firms perceive to be important.” (Bartlett and
Ghoshal, 1993 p. 46)
Heterarchies and horizontal organizations
Also being a member of the process  school, Hedlund  has developed an organization
model, the heterarchy, fairly similar to the transnational and  multifocal  structures
(Hedlund,  1986;  Hedlund and Rolander,  1990). While Prahalad, Doz, Bartlett and
Ghoshal very clearly base  their  statements on the  strategy-structure  paradigm,
Hedlund  takes  Perlmutter’s  (1969) typology of multinational firms, based on
management attitudes, as point of departure.
According to Hedlund (1986), the heterarchical MNC is a special case of geocentricity,
distinguishing itself from the standard geocentric firm in terms of strategy as well as
structure. Strategically, competitive advantages are not only derived from the center
but also actively searched for in subsidiaries around the world.  Structure, instead of
being the product of strategy,  determines  strategy:  ”...the hypermodern MNC  first
defines its structural properties and then looks for strategic options following from these
properties.” (Hedlund, 1986, p. 20).26
Thus, in contrast to Prahalad, Doz, Bartlett and Ghoshal, Hedlund questions the stra-
tegy-structure  paradigm,  arguing  that  ”things do not necessarily start in the en-
vironment” (Hedlund and Rolander, 1990, p. 22). Environment, strategy and structure
are so closely connected and interdependent that it is often impossible to decide which
is the leading factor in a change. Managers cannot wait for the environment to make
signals; to be successful, they must act in all three areas.
Outlining an alternative framework, Hedlund and Rolander (1990) suggest that ”...it is
possible,  and perhaps unavoidable, to think in terms of packages of strategy and
structure characteristics. A main point, however, is that the structural items are most
important...” (p. 26). Structure is primary and  determines what strategies can be
pursued and what parts of the environment to consider.
Strategy should be seen as action patterns over time. There are two kinds of action
patterns: programmes of exploitation focusing on effective  utilization of existing
resources and programmes of experimentation focusing on search for opportunities.
Fig: Elements of an alternative logic (Hedlund and Rolander, 1990, p. 23)
”The environment does not ‘hang around’ to be analyzed. Rather, it is a canvas to be
painted...” (Hedlund and Rolander, 1990, p. 30). The environment is defined,  selected
and  created by the firm. This is close to Weick’s (1969) concept of ‘enacted
environment’, but the actual creating of domains is stressed even more. The global
reach of multinationals creates a large scope of opportunities by combining elements
so far not combined, by utilizing  the  symbiotic  potential in the environment
(Perlmutter, 1984).
The heterarchical structure is characterized by many centres of different kinds. The
headquarter functions are geographically dispersed and strategic roles are assigned to
subsidiaries. There is a mix of organizing principles; no dimension, such as product,
country or function, is overall superordinate. The structure is flexible  over time:
emphasis on product integration one year may the next year shift to emphasis on
market differentiation.
Apparently, a heterarchy resembles a matrix organization, but  there are some
important differences. For a heterarchy, the patterns of coordination are more mixed
and flexible, the different elements of the organization are linked by internal, flexible
processes and conflicts are resolved laterally, not vertically.
Action:
1. Programs of exploitation
2. Programs of experimentation
Structure:






The management systems, communication processes and corporate culture are seen
as more important parts of the structure than the formal organization. Integration is
achieved primarily through normative control rather than by calculative or coercive
mechanisms. Corporate goals, strategies and guiding principles of behavior are widely
shared in the organization. Access to detailed information is ensured in all parts of the
firm; information technology is one of the forces leading companies to heterarchy.
The relationships in the model  are not deterministic; a certain structure  does not
necessarily correspond to a certain strategy. Hedlund and Rolander claim:  ”Only a
broad  correspondence, relating degree and type of heterarchy to degree of ex-
perimentation in strategy and type of global advantage sought, can be stated.” (1990, p.
33). The notion of ‘fit’ between the three elements is not seen as important. The model
is best interpreted as a system of learning, where the relationships are dynamic
rather than static.
Hedlund and Rolander admit that  the heterarchical model  has precursors in
Mintzberg (1973), Hedberg et al. (1976) and others, but maintain that the totality of
their model entails a new conception, particularly suited for large, geographically
dispersed organizations. However, the need for heterarchical structure varies; there is
room  for  more  rigidly  and  permanently defined structures, making the degree of
heterarchy an interesting variable.
White  and Poynter (1990), introducing the  horizontal organization, similar to the
heterarchy, agree that this is not a universal model: ”Whether called a heterarchy, a
geocentric or a horizontal organization, this form is not for every business.” (p. 96). This
is a high cost organization being worth while only when there is a significant business
potential for a mix of advantages.
As the international environment becomes  more complex and  dynamic, White and
Poynter argue, strategies based on singular competitive advantages, such as cost
leadership or differentiation, will not ensure survival and success. To do so, strategies
must build on a combination or ‘mosaic’ of advantages.
However, this is not just a problem of strategic choice; to develop  and  maintain a
mosaic of advantages requires a unique  organizational solution. As the  figure
illustrates, the global  product structure exploits globally-based advantages at the
expense of locally-based advantages, while the area structure exploits locally-
based advantages at the expense of globally-based advantages. Firms  intending to
simultaneously achieve both global and  local  advantages must have organizations
designed  for  identifying,  balancing  and exploiting advantages  flowing  from many
different sources.
According to White and Poynter, all  conventional organizational prescriptions suffer
from the same root problem: ”The belief that information (and decisions) should flow
vertically to some point within the organization, where a person or group charged with
the appropriate authority decides. These decisions are based upon the application of a
narrow logic incorporating a single historically-based perspective on advantage.” (1990,
p. 97).28
Fig:  Relationships between strategic advantages and organization 
structures (White and Poynter, 1990, p. 97).
But this view is not incorrect; it is contingent upon the opportunities for strategic
advantage. In the three companies studied, Dow, IBM and Matsushita, the managers,
instead of referring issues upwards, addressed them at their level, contacted peers in
other units and entered into collaboration with them. Coordinating the geographically
dispersed functional units, these  lateral  processes were supported by a flexible
horizontal network and a common set of shared  premises. Thus, horizontal
organizations are characterized by three key attributes:
• Lateral decision processes
• Horizontal network
• Shared decision premises
Lateral decision processes may include direct contacts, liason roles, temporary task
forces, or more permanent teams. Typical effects of these processes are:
• Directing product flows between units
• Developing and adjusting joint action programmes
• Sharing information and knowledge
Criticism of the process school: lack of process orientation
In the article ”Internationalization as a Strategy Process” Melin  (1992), examining
the work of the process school, dryly remarks: ”...it is quite unusual for a rather small
group of researchers to appoint themselves as constituting a new paradigm.”
According to Melin, the contribution of Bartlett, Ghoshal, Doz and Prahalad builds on
the identification of the  management of tensions between the  economic  and the




















direct control is not possible, a more subtle strategic control mechanism is created by
means of the organizational context.
The work of Bartlett and Ghoshal represents ”a surprisingly strong belief in the envi-
ronment-strategy-structure paradigm...” Their basic assumption is that environmental
forces shape the strategic profile of a business, while  the administrative heritage of
the firm shapes its structure and capabilities.
Melin admits that  the emirical research by Bartlett and  Ghoshal provides an
important understanding of three basic forms of MNCs and supplements the old, but
still valid, typology of the global  enterprise presented by Pearlmutter (1969) but
critizes their framework for lacking process  dimensions  and  characteristics of the
strategy process.
The ‘process school’ is, with few exceptions, such as Doz and Prahalad (1987), lacking
a process perspective: ”Knowledge about structural forms of international business is
unusually well-developed, while the knowledge about the transition of these structures is
certainly insufficient.” Melin argues that research on MNCs should be more focused on
processes over time  and regard structures as temporary manifestations of such
processes.
To manage the dilemma of simultaneously achieving local responsiveness,  global
efficiency  and  transfer of knowledge,  Bartlett  and  Ghoshal  have constructed a
solution, the transnational organization model,  not empirically derived  but a more
speculative suggestion brought forth by their studies. A similar, speculative model is
the heterarchy (Hedlund, 1986).
Melin claims that such organizations are not easy to manage: ”The threat of internal
fragmentation and dissipation is obvious, because of the strong degree of dispersion.
Furthermore,  the interdependence may counteract  the need for  flexibility, since the
complexity  can obstruct the  necessary learning capability.  However, according to
Bartlett and Ghoshal, these problems can be resolved by top management if they succeed
in legitimizing diverse perspectives, developing multiple coordination  and  innovation
processes, and building shared vision and individual commitment.”
According to Melin, the ambition to capture the complexity in large, global business
firms is desirable but the models suggested by the ‘process  school’  require an
extremely skillful and powerful top management  being  able to control all  internal
forces in a large worldwide  corporation. To unite the dispersed MNCs by means of
cultural control, a rather monolithic culture seems to be necessary. However, the
underlying assumptions of culture as a variable that can be controlled from the top of
the organization are questioned by many students of organizational culture, e.g.,
Smircich (1983) and Alvesson and Berg (1992).
The emphasis on a managerial focus has also led to a normative bias, which seems to
be increasing with an increased  degree of speculation in conceptual frameworks
without empirical support.
Including the work of Hamel and Prahalad in the process school, Melin considers their
concepts for understanding strategic capabilities of MNCs, such as strategic intent
(Hamel  and  Prahalad,  1989),  core  competencies (Prahalad and  Hamel,  1990) and30
resource leverage (Hamel and Prahalad, 1993), intuitively to be quite reasonable, but
when considered more carefully, to be vague and lack descriptive precision.
In a review of ”Managing the Global Firm” (Bartlett, Doz and Hedlund, 1990), Fors-
gren  (1992)  criticizes the book for being superficial  and  full of brave  statements
regarding  the  need  for lateral information processes,  integration  and  collaboration
between subsidiaries, etc. He identifies two main problems in their work:
•   Integration is strongly overemphasized compared to differentiation. There is a risk
that  integration,  especially  when  combined  with ‘global’, is taken as the more
progressive device, neglecting the limitations and costs of integration.
•   It is taken for granted that the headquarter can achieve efficient integration by
design of structure and systems, neglecting the political aspects of the problem.
”...the attempt to give a new interpretation of the global firm is combined here with
an instrumental and rather conventional perspective on organizations.” (p. 479).
Studying ABB and the problems of integrating a multi-domestic enterprise, Berggren
(1996)  questions if the transnational organization exists in reality: ”The truly
transnational corporation, so eloquently described by researchers in international
management, and in which cross-national learning and development flow freely, is still
a slippery animal to catch.” (p. 136)
Berggren criticizes the process school for being preoccupied with concepts such as
networks, heterarchies and  lateral  communication, neglecting  classical questions
concerning power and  control,  strategy  and  structure.  Referring to Martinez and
Jarillo (1989)  and Malnight (1995), he remarks that informal  and  subtle forms of
coordination are added  to, not substituted for, formal and  structural mechanisms;
typically, there is a complex mixture of different control  and  coordination  mecha-
nisms.
Analysing ABB, often depicted as the prototype of the heterarchy, from a Chand-
lerian perspective, Berggren claims the ”small-company philosophy” and emphasis on
maximum decentralization to be strongly related to the  need  for financial
accountability  and  transparency  when growing by acquisitions. Later, when
acquisitions became a less important strategy, ABB focused more on integration,
standardization and economies of scale. At the same time, the international product
dimension was strengthened at the expense of the local and national dimension.31
The Network Perspective on International Management
The multinational as an interorganizational network
Building on their concept of the transnational organization (Bartlett  and  Ghoshal,
1989), Ghoshal and Bartlett (1990) further elaborate the notion of the multinational
corporation as an integrated network. Believing that  large  MNCs can be more
appropriately conceptualized as an interorganizational network rather than as a
unitary organization, they state:
”In particular, we believe that the concept of a network, both as a metaphor and in terms
of the tools and techniques of analysis it provides, reflects the nature and complexity of
the multinational organization and can provide a useful lens through which to examine
this entity.” (1990, p. 79)
Ghoshal and  Bartlett note that this approach is not entirely new within  the inter-
national management research, even an early works, such as Perlmutter’s (1969)
classification of ethnocentric, polycentric and  geocentric organizations, is clearly
influenced by a network perspective. On the whole, the research focus has shifted
from  dyadic headquarters-subsidiary relationships and foreign direct  investment
decisions to the management of networks of established foreign subsidiaries.
However, in contrast to most earlier  works,  imprinted by technical  and  economic
rationality, the Ghoshal and  Bartlett approach emphasizes the social and
institutional  structure of the multinational  environments.  Referring to Meyer and
Scott (1983) and  Zucker  (1988), they point to the important  role  that  relational
networks in the institutional environment play in influencing  the structure and
behavior of organizations. Further, quoting DiMaggio and Powell (1983 p. 150)
”organizations compete not just for resources and customers, but for political power and
institutional legitimacy, for social as well as economic fitness”.
Ghoshal and Bartlett (1990) question the often taken for granted power of the MNC
headquarters; even though the parent company of a multinational  corporation
typically exerts considerable hierarchical authority, this kind of power does not
necessarily constitute the dominant or the ‘last resort’ mechanism of control.
Referring to authors, such as Granovetter (1985), showing  the  linkage  between
ownership and hierarchical power in complex organizations to be much weaker than is
often assumed, they believe that this link is particularly weak in the case of MNCs,
”not only because some of the subsidiaries happen to be very distant and resource-rich,
but more so because they control critical linkages with key actors in their  local
environments, particularly the host government. ...Subsidiary company links with local
customers, suppliers and investors also contribute to the local management’s autonomy.”
(1990, p. 82)
A limitation of traditional organization theory, particularly critical to the analysis of
the complex and dispersed multinational corporations, is the view of the environment
as an exogenous entity and reified source of undefined uncertainties. In contrast, most
interorganizational theories treat the environment as a field of specific  interacting
organizations  and  focus on the exchange relations and  the transfer of resources
between actors, where resources include not only the flows of money and products but
also of technology, people and information.32
Such exchange relations are maintained through many different mechanisms, such as
integrating  government agencies, interlocking  boards of directors, cross-holding of
equity, institutionalized systems of personnel flows, long-term contracts  and  trust-
based relationships, and mediating roles of organizations such as trade associations,
banks and consultants.
By the term ‘multinational network’ Ghoshal and Bartlett refer to all existing relation-
ships and linkages among the different units of the company.  Following Aldrich and
Whetten (1981), they state that each national unit of the MNC is embedded in an
unique  context  and  has its unique  organization-set.  The  organization-sets may
themselves be interconnected, and all members of all  the organization-sets of the
different units collectively constitute what Ghoshal  and  Bartlett  call the ‘external
network’ within which the multinational network is embedded.
The density of an organization-set is defined as the extensiveness of exchange ties
within  the element of the organization-set, measuring the extent to which actors
within  the  set  are connected to one another. The density of ties  within an
organization-set is called within density, and the density of ties within  the external
network – that is, across the different organization-sets – is denoted across density.
By the term resource configuration Ghoshal and Bartlett refer to the way in which the
resources of a MNC are distributed among its different units; dispersal is the extent to
which the company’s resources are concentrated in one unit versus dispersed among
the different units, andspecialization represents the extent to which  the  resources
located in each unit are differentiated from those in others.
When the density within  the organization-sets is low,  the  influence of the social
context is limited and economic rationality  becomes  dominant in resource configu-
ration decisions. Consequently, the MNC  will  concentrate research, production,
assembly  and  other similar activities and  locate them in national  resource niches
(Aldrich, 1979) based on the comparative advantage of the coluntry. As a result, the
resource  configuration  will be characterized by relatively low  dispersal  and high
specialization.
When the within  density is high,  the  influence of the social context increases in
resource configuration decisions. The MNC will split up its activities and locate more
of the different kinds of resources in each market to create the variety necessary to
match  the structures of the local organization-sets. Consequently, dispersal will be
relatively high while specialization will be low.
However, these effects of the within density on the resource configuration are inter-
twined with the effects of the  across  density in the external network. Due to im-
provements in communication and transportation infrastructures around the world, a
wide range of industries have experienced increasing across densities in recent years.
Thus,  low within density  will  lead to low dispersal  and  high  specialization,  with
resources located according to the resource niches in different countries, but, com-
bined with high across density, many of these national resource niches will  cease to
exist because of freer flows of capital and information. If technologies can be quickly
transferred from one country to another, or if excess capital available in one market
can be borrowed in another market, there is no longer  reason  for  concentrating33
specific activities to specific locations. So, high  across  density  will  counteract the
effects of low within density and suppress resource concentration.
High within density will lead to high  dispersal and low specialization, with resources
matching the structures of the local environments, but, combined with high  across
density, there is no longer reason for establishing a range of resources in each market,
since exchange linkages can be set up across boarders. So, high  across  density will
counteract the effects of high within density and suppress resource fragmentation.
Referring to the influence by the distribution of power on the flow of resources within
an interorganizational network (Benson, 1975), Ghoshal and Bartlett suggest that the
relative power of the headquarters and the national units is indicated by within and
across  densities in the organization-sets of the MNC. High within density  can be
expected to increase the power of the national units,  while low within density can be
expected to increase the power of the headquarters.
Across densities principally affect the structural power, i.e., the position within the
network. The members of the multinational network can potentially develop different
levels of structural power based on their centrality within the larger network across
different countries. Ghoshal and Bartlett define the point centrality of each actor as a
function of the number of actors within the network with which it has direct exchange
relations.
 When linkages among the subsidiaries are minimal, i.e, the across density is low, the
headquarters has the highest level of point centrality. Generally, as across  density
increases, linkages become more extensive and  the centrality of the headquarters
declines. Besides the headquarters, other units within  the MNC may  develop a high
level of point centrality. These units may emerge as nodes in the external network due
to strategic positions,  e.g. in markets  with  major  customers or in countries  with
advanced state of technologies.
Densities within and across  the national organization-sets can be expected to vary
across countries; densities across the national organization-sets may be high for the
developed countries but low in developing  countries.  Similarly, densities within the
national organization-sets may be high in homogenous countries with a tradition of
strong interinstitutional linkages,  and low in countries  where such linkages are
restricted through legislation.
Ghoshal and  Bartlett, referring to their prior research on a number of large multi-
national companies such as Procter & Gamble,  Unilever,  Ericsson, NEC and
Matsushita (Bartlett and Ghoshal, 1989), claim to have shown they are increasingly
converging to this network form despite the differences in their businesses and parent
company nationalities and propose:
”If within density is a country trait and across density is a world-system trait, the
pattern of linkages in the  overall  structure of the external network is going to be
increasingly similar for large MNCs, irrespective of their businesses. In other words,
mimetic and normative forces of isomorphism (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983) may be
getting stronger as the world jolts along to T. Levitt’s ‘global village’, and the observed
trend of convergence to the differentiated network structure may be an outcome of these
broader societal changes.” (1990, p. 100)34
Nordic contributions to international management research
Within international management research, there are principally two domains where
Nordic scholars have made major contributions. The first is the field of the internatio-
nalization process  where Jan Johanson and his colleagues developed  what became
known as the Uppsala internationalization model (Johanson and Vahlne, 1977). The
second is the network field where Håkan Håkansson, Jan Johanson, Mats Forsgren
and others have elaborated the network perspective, focusing on business relation-
ships and subsidiary roles (Andersson and Johanson, 1997;  Håkansson, 1982).
Compared  with  American  and  British international management scholars, Nordic
researchers seem to be particularly influenced by authors such as Cyert and  March
(1963), Weick (1976) and Pfeffer and Salancik (1978). Organizations should be seen,
not as unitary hierarchies, but as loosely coupled systems, controlled by coalitions of
shifting interest groups. The international firm is sen as a heterogenous entity with
subsidiaries playing different roles, representing different interests  and  controlling
different sets of resources (Björkman and Forsgren, 1997).
The centre-periphery metaphor, dominating the international business field, should be
replaced by a multi-centre perspective  where  the subsidiaries, not only the
headquarters, exert influence on corporate strategy. Nordic scholars are also working
with a somewhat  different  market concept than normally used in international
business research:
”This new market concept, in combination with the loose-coupling image, means not
only that the firm’s relationships with the market are looked upon as being less ‘market-
like’, but also that the internal relationships are somewhat more ‘market-like’ than is
usually assumed in international business research.” (Björkman and Forsgren, 1997)
While internationalization for the most part has been treated as a matter of foreign
sales or production, Nordic research has lately been increasingly directed towards
other functional areas, such as the internationalization of R&D (Håkanson and Nobel,
1993;  Ridderstråle, 1996). Nordic researchers has gradually turned their attention to
the difficulties of managing networks of subsidiaries with different resources and
environments. To an increasing extent, the international firm is seen as a social
community,  engaged in creating  and transfering  knowledge.  Important  future
research issues may involve the underlying factors of the development of organiza-
tional capabilities in the different subsidiaries and to what extent it is possible for
headquarters to influence these factors (Björkman and Forsgren, 1997).
The Uppsala Internationalization Model
Nordic international business research is presumably best known for investigating
the internationalization process of the firm, resulting in the Uppsala internationaliza-
tion model (Johanson and Vahlne, 1977).
In contrast to much of international  business research, from an economics per-
spective  focusing on why foreign direct investments are made, the Uppsala  model,
based on the behavioral theory of the firm (Cyert and March, 1963), ask the question
how foreign investments are actually carried through, aiming at understanding the
underlying forces of the process.35
Taking a network perspective and emphasizing the social and  cognitive ties in busi-
ness relationships, the model points out the difficulties in formulating a strategy for
market entry and then implementing it; on-going interaction is stressed rather than
specific strategic decisions (Johanson and Vahlne, 1992).
The internationalization of a firm is seen as a process in which the  firm gradually
increases its international involvement. The process is sequential; the firm passes a
number of logical steps of international behavior, from  initial  export to setting up
production units abroad. However, this is not seen as a sequence of deliberately
planned steps based on rational analysis. Instead, the internationalization process,
characterized by successive  learning  through  stages of increasing  commitment to
foreign markets, will  proceed along the logical steps  regardless of whether strategic
decisions in this direction are made or not (Johanson and Vahlne, 1990).
The successive  learning takes place in an interplay between a gradual  acquisition,
integration and use of knowledge about foreign markets and  operations on one hand
and a successively  increasing commitment of resources to foreign  markets on the
other. This development of experiential knowledge about foreign markets is necessary
to overcome the ‘psychic distance’ to these markets.
The psychic distance between the domestic and foreign market derive from differen-
ces in language, culture, education level, business practice and  political system
between the two countries. Since this perceived distance is expected to disturb the
flow of information between the firm and  the foreign  market, firms will  enter new
markets with successively  greater psychic  distance. Thus, firms start  their inter-
nationalization on markets with the lowest perceived uncertainty – on markets easy
to understand, often in neigh-bour countries.
”A critical assumption (of the  model) is that the  market  knowledge, including
perceptions of the market opportunities and problems, is acquired primarily through
experience  from  current business activities in the  market. Experiential market
knowledge generates business opportunities and is consequently a driving force in the in-
ternationalization process” (Johanson and Vahlne, 1990, p. 12).
Considerable effort has been made to test the validity of the internationalization pro-
cess  model empirically. The model is based on research on Swedish firms, but has
gained strong support in several other studies, showing that its validity is not limited
to small countries which are highly dependent on export (Melin, 1992).
However, the support for the Uppsala  model is not  undisputed;  the  model  has  a
number of shortcomings which have been acknowledged by Johansson  and  Vahne
(1990). It is overly deterministic, it applies merely to early stages of internationa-
lization and its explanatory value of psychic distance tends to decrease over time. The
model is critized for being less valid for very large multinational corporations, firms
with large international experience, high-technological companies, service industries
and international operations not motivated by market seeking. Finally, it does not pay
very much attention to acquisition as a way of internationalization.
In addition to the Uppsala model, Scandinavian researchers have developed frame-
works based on the network  perspective  for analyzing the internationalization
process. Johanson and  Vahlne  (1992) have shown how the internationalization
process has been influenced by gradually developed relationships in certain markets.36
According to Johanson and Mattsson (1988), the internationalization of a firm can be
achieved through (1) the establishment of relationships in country networks that are
new to the firm, (2) the development of relationships in those networks, and  (3) con-
necting existing networks in different countries.
The network  model of the organization-environment interface
The Scandinavian network model has its origin in a research programme beginning in
the middle of the 1970’s at the University of Uppsala (see e.g.,  Håkansson,  1982;
Hägg and  Johanson, 1982). It was observed that business organizations often had
continuous exchange relationships with a limited number of entities in their
environment, where each entity exerted considerable influence on the organization.
For the most part, these were industrial firms working with a fairly small number of
suppliers, customers and competitors, but further studies indicated that this type of
network seemed to be frequent among business organizations in general (Håkansson,
1989a).
Continuous interaction and  exchange develop relationships between parties linking
their resources and activities and creating a web of personal relations. A complex set
of interdependencies gradually evolves, in which activities of one party are connected
with the activities of another, giving rise to mutual adaptions and new routines. Each
party can gain access to the other’s resources, and may, to some extent, mobilize and
use these resources. Since distinctive capabilities unique to each party are generated
and have meaning only in relation to other parties, the identity of an organization is
created in interaction with major counterparts (Håkansson, 1989b).
This web of relationships an organization is embedded in, can be called a network. The
effectiveness of an organization operating in a network is dependent not only on how
well the direct interaction with other parties is managed but also on how these parties
manage their interactions with third parties.
Since the identity is closely related to the interaction with other entities in the net-
work, environment is not an adequate concept;  the  notion of an enacted ‘context’
seems to be more useful when referring to the set of related entities. Håkansson thus
summarizes the following propositions of the network model:
1. Firms often act in a context in which their actions are conditioned by other actors,
each being unique and pursuing its own goals.
2. In the continuous interaction and  exchange with other actors,  firms are able to
access and exploit the resources of other actors and coordinate their activities.
3. Since the distinctive capabilities of a firm are developed in interaction, the identity
of the firm is created in the relationships with other parties.
4. The performance of a firm is conditioned by the network as a context, including also
third parties.
Managing multi-center firms and international business enterprises
Assuming that a firm-specific advantage over local companies is necessary for foreign
investment, mainstream foreign direct investment theory cannot satisfactorily
explain further internationalization of already highly  internationalized firms. To an
internationally experienced firm, the incentive to invest abroad frequently is its
existing foreign assets rather than home-based resources. The theory disregards the37
firm’s history, prior experience and existing relationships with other firms – factors of
crucial importance in the internationalization process (Forsgren, 1990).
Forsgren (1990) suggests that the traditional theory should be replaced by an interor-
ganizational approach to foreign investment; then internationalization can be seen as
a way of managing strategic interdependencies in industrial networks. New investors
have to create a position in foreign industrial  networks  and  investments  must
therefore be based on home-based strengths. The experienced investor, however, can
use his existing position in the network as a base for further investment abroad.
Despite a steadily growing  number of acquisitions of foreign  production units since
1970, foreign direct investment theory has paid little attention to acquisition as a way
of internationalization. In a study of Swedish industry, Forsgren (1989)  also  found
foreign acquisitions to be much more frequent among highly internationalized firms.
From an interorganizational point of view, the management of relationships is an im-
portant strategic issue, and one obvious strategy is to acquire other firms in the same
network.
After the first stage, in which the internationalization is based on a gradual exploita-
tion of firm-specific advantages, controlled by the headquarters, further interna-
tionalization often leads to a new situation, where the foreign markets become in-
creasingly important and the subsidiaries more powerful and independent. The parent
company’s influence decreases due to the increasing knowledge about production and
markets in the subsidiaries.
Some subsidiaries may enter markets outside their own and come to play a strategic
role in a certain product area. If this occurs in various product areas in the same firm,
a multi-centre structure with several centres in different geographic areas may
develop,  each centre exploiting  the specific advantage of ”its” country. In such a
multi-centre firm, new products and processes can appear in many places and be ex-
ploited on an international basis.
In a study of 22 of the most  internationalized Swedish firms, Forsgren (1990) has
investigated the occurrence of multi-centre structures. Five indicators,  measuring
different  types of centres of gravity abroad, were used to identify foreign-based
centres. Four indicators were related to production, marketing, purchasing and R&D
while  the fifth indicator  was  related to the formal organization and labeled
management centre.
In total, the 22 firms had 294 overseas centres, of which 205 were production centres,
40 marketing centres, 31 management centres and 18 research centres (no
purchasing  centres). Most of the firms  had several overseas centres, being  most
significant in firms with more than half of their employees abroad. There was a close
correlation between the degree of internationalization and the prevalence of a multi-
centre structure; management and research centres existed only when the degree of
internationalization was high.
One important conclusion from the study is that  the former periphery in many
Swedish  firms  has  developed  its own centres  with  power to influence further de-
velopment of the company as a whole. Consequently, the international firm can be
seen as a loosely coupled political system, each part also being engaged in industrial
networks of interdependent companies.38
”An industrial network consists of units which are functionally linked via transactions
of physical resources and/or knowledge, or appear in the same purchasing or sales
market. Each unit often has its specific function in this system and frequently obtains
components from other units therein.” (Forsgren, 1990, p 264)
Such networks are not designed by the headquarters but emerge in an interplay
between semi-autonomous, interdependent  actors,  developing their own business
relationships in the network. A subsidiary belongs to two different systems, an
industrial network and the owner system, and is subject to tensions between the two
roles,  but the longer a subsidiary  has been operating in a country, the more its
behavior will be influenced by the network.
This transition from centre-periphery systems to multi-centre systems has forced top
management to change their  way of governing  and  find new ways of getting
legitimacy, such as symbolic behavior. by which top management can confer meaning
on a firm’s behavior decided elsewhere. The role of subsidiary management has also
changed,  from an implementer of headquarters strategies to a stakeholder in
corporate strategy-making.
Based on a network framework, Andersson and Johanson (1997) offer a new definition
of international firm and  international business, stressing exchange relationships in
business life.  Since business is principally a matter of connecting different actors
through  exchange relationships, a business enterprise becomes  international by
connecting actors in different countries.
Even though most studies of the multinational firm today recognize the importance of
other functions, the way  the firm’s production is organized around the  world  still
seems to be the main competitive factor. Underlining  the importance of  the global
structure of activities such as R&D, marketing  and  purchasing, Andersson and
Johanson place these activities in focus when  discussing  competitiveness of the
multinational firm.
By frequent exchange in a business relationship, two partners can  gradually learn
about each other’s needs and capabilities and find opportunities to reduce the cost of
exchange and increase their joint productivity. Managers in different functions develop
and  maintain extensive contacts,  learning about each other’s ways of dealing with
different problems.
In business relationships, knowledge exchange not only takes place and is intertwined
with  product exchange, but also new and unique knowledge is created.  Such
relationships serve as platforms for future business transactions creating knowledge
and competence that may contribute significantly to the competitive advantage but
also constitute constraints on the firm’s business.
Business relationships, based on trust and mutual knowledge and involving intentions,
expectations  and  interpretations, cannot be understood by those  outside the
relationship. Only the  insider  can  judge whether the effort spent on a business
relationship is worth while.
The partners in a business relationship are directly tied to each other and  indirectly
tied to a wider network of business relationships. Consequently, the intentions and
expectations of one  business  relationship are interrelated with  those in other
relationships, as is the interpretations of any  one relationship. Since the business39
partners are interdependent, they can exercise some, although limited, control over
each other (Andersson and Johanson, 1997).
Assuming that competitiveness is based on the exchange structure of the firm, they
suggests a firm concept  placing attention on exchange, the business enterprise, and
defined it as ”...a pattern of activities that link a set of actors and resources with the
purpose of exploiting exchange opportunities in a market.” (Snehota, 1990 p. 42)
Contrary to the firm in economic theory, defined without  reference to other firms,
business enterprise is defined on the basis of its exchange relations with others. In a
business  enterprise, the critical source of competitive advantage is its  business
relationships; the competitive position is a result of its ability to connect business
relationships. Thus, the specific competitive ability of a business enterprise is based
on the combined knowledge from a unique, connected set of business relationships. In
this  way new knowledge is created  through  market  exchange  within a set of
interrelated business relationships.
In contrast to the traditional view of market exchange as merely a function of finding
an outlet for the products and of getting access to resources, Andersson and Johanson
suggest that ”the relationships with customers and suppliers are lasting, structural
constraints that can serve as starting point when  trying to understand the  distinctive
competitive  ability of business enterprise better than production...” They also claim
business relationships to be more important than organization of production with
regard to knowledge development and, thus, long term competitiveness.
Taking a step further, Andersson and  Johanson (1997) define international business
enterprise as a business enterprise connecting business relationships in several
countries. This means that market exchange in a foreign markets is a necessary, but
not sufficient, condition for international business  enterprise. Consequently, the
internationalization of business enterprise is a question of the degree to which the
business enterprise is connecting business relationships in different countries.
The international business enterprise may, but does not necessarily, have business
enterprises in several countries – it may well consist of one single business enterprise
engaged in international business  relationships. In contrast to the international
business enterprise, the multinational business enterprise has business enterprises in
several countries without having any connecting relationships. Thus, SKF is a highly
internationalized business enterprise, not becuse it has large production units in a
number of countries, but because those units are closely connected to each other.
Unless they participate directly, headquarters can neither understand what is going
on in business relationships nor judge wether investments in business relationships
are justified. Since the profits of subsidiaries in international  business enterprises
derive from business relationships, measuring profitability by current profitability
criteria is meaningless. Consequently, the possibility of controlling subsidiaries in
international business enterprises is quite limited.
Referring to Pfeffer and Salancik (1978), Andersson and Johanson (1997) further pro-
pose that power in international business enterprises derives from control over
important business relationships. This means that subsidiaries can use such power to
gain control over over critical connections and, in this way, develop their exchange and
thereby the future development of the international business enterprise.40
MNC subsidiary management
Although large multinational corporations have attracted the attention of researchers
for  many  decades, the subsidiary-focused research  did  not  become an important
strand of MNC research  until in the early 1980s.  Birkinshaw  and Hood (1998)





Most of the early research on MNC subsidiaries focused on different aspects of head-
quarters-subsidiary relationships, such as centralization, formalization and  control,
e.g.,  Otterbeck (1981). Birkinshaw  and Hood underline  that  this  focus on dyadic
relationships was entirely consistent with the view of those times of MNCs as hier-
archical, centralized corporations in which  the foreign  subsidiaries served as pure
sales outlets or assembly  plants. Much of this research saw subsidiaries as
instruments of the parent company,  assuming that headquarters could manage all
subsidiaries in almost the same way.
In the middle of the  1980’s,  beginning with White  and  Poynter’s (1984) study of
Canadian subsidiaries, the research focus shifted to from dyadic relationships to sub-
sidiary roles. For the first time, the subsidiary, rather than its relationship with
headquarters, was the focal unit of analysis, and in several studies, such as Ghoshal
and Bartlett (1990) and Hedlund (1986), subsidiaries were seen as nodes in networks.
In most cases the subsidiary’s role were seen as assigned by  headquarters; in other
cases  the subsidiary was  recognized as a more autonomous unit  defining  its own
strategy.  Besides headquarters, industry sector,  local  business environment,
relationships  with  sister  subsidiaries  and  entrepreneurial  drive of subsidiary
management have been pointed out as determinants of the subsidiary role (Birkin-
shaw and Hood, 1998).
In a number of studies, typologies with typically three or four different subsidiary
roles were developed. In White and Poynter’s Canadian study, for example, five roles
were identified: miniature replica, product specialist,  rationalized  manufacturer,
strategic independent and marketing satellite. As previously described, Bartlett and
Ghoshal (1989) distinguished between strategic leader, contributor, implementer and
the black hole.  Birkinshaw  and  Morrison  (1995) have proposed a simple typology
mapping most of the typologies of the  prior research:
•   The local implementer has limited geographic scope, usually a single country, and a
severely constrained product range. This role corresponds roughly to the miniature
replica of White and Poynter and to the implementer of Bartlett and Ghoshal.
•   The specialized contributor has considerable expertise in certain functions but is
tightly coordinated with other subsidiaries. This role approximates the contributor
of Bartlett and Ghoshal and the product specialist and  rationalized manufacturer
of White and Poynter.
•   The world mandate has worldwide or regional responsibility for a product or entire
business.  The product scope is typically unconstrained. This role  matches the
strategic leader of Bartlett and Ghoshal and the strategic independent of White and
Poynter.41
The third school, subsidiary development, seeks an answer to the question: How and
why do the activities of subsidiaries change over time? It is based on the network
perspective but also has elements of the resource-based view;  over time the
subsidiary accumulates valuable capabilities through its network relationships, which
leads to an increased status  and  thus to an extension of the scope of its activities
(Birkinshaw and Hood, 1997).
Although several studies of subsidiary roles, such as Jarillo and Martinez (1990) and
Gupta and Govindarajan (1994) shed some light on the development process, it is only
in recent years research focusing on subsidiary development has emerged.
Using a sample of foreign-owned manufacturing subsidiaries in UK, Taggart (1998)
explores the question of strategy  evolution in multinational subsidiaries. Extending
Porter’s  (1986)  coordination-configuration framework (previously described), he
distinguishes four different subsidiary strategies:
•   The strategic auxiliary, corresponding to Porter’s purest global strategy, is a highly
focused subsidiary with fairly limited autonomy.
•   The confederate subsidiary, corresponding to Porter’s high foreign  investment
strategy, has also limited autonomy but act in a participative and responsive way.
•   The autarchic subsidiary, corresponding to Porter’s country-centred strategy, has a
higher level of autonomy and performs more value-chain activities locally.
•   The detached subsidiary, corresponding to Porter’s export-based strategy, should
not exist at all except as a transitional form.
Taggart concludes that there is an overall trend towards increased coordination of the
subsidiaries. While the detached subsidiary is seen as a temporary phase that all sub-
sidiary managers would like to leave as soon as possible, the strategic auxiliary is the
preferred end point for most subsidiary managers.
Forsgren and Pedersen (1998) investigate the extent to which subsidiaries of foreign-
owned  firms in Denmark function as centres of excellence  and  which  factors
contribute to subsidiaries becoming centres of excellence. Reviewing the literature,
they distinguish two different traditions within  the research on subsidiary roles: the
product mandate approach and the network-based models.
The product mandate approach is focused on the extent to which the subsidiary can
operate as a fully equipped firm with its own export and development activities. The
word ‘mandate’ suggests that the subsidiary is assigned something by the
headquarters,  typically a mandate to sell  products  worldwide.  Autonomy is
emphasized rather than interdependence; to qualify as a product mandate, the
subsidiary should not only control the production and marketing of products but also
have a substantial influence of the development of these products.
The authors find the concept of product mandate strikingly similar to usual definitions
of product division but criticize the research for not offering a precise  definition of
product mandate.
Within the tradition of network-based  models, two bodies of literature can be dis-
cerned. In the first one the network MNC is seen as a new ideal type of organization,
evoked by conditions requiring  MNCs to change from bureaucratic to more flexible,
organic structures composed of personal networks rather than formal relationships.42
Forsgren and Pedersen consider the meaning of networks in these models not being
quite clear but note that the models lay stress on the information flows in the
network. Integration rather than differentiation  seems to be the keyword, and, in
contrast to the product mandate view, interdependence rather than autonomy seems
to be the focus. Subsidiaries contribute to the overall objectives by being a part of the
corporate strategy in a learning organization; consequently, networks of information
and knowledge flows within the MNC become crucial.
The other body of literature describes the network MNC in terms of business re-
lationships,  based on theories about  industrial  networks, particularly the view of
markets as a set of exchange relationships between actors  controlling  business
activities (see previous section).
In contrast to the information network view, emphasizing the control and integration
of the subsidiary to fulfil a specific corporate role, the business network view calls
attention to the development of the subsidiary as a result of the interaction with other
business actors, including external actors.  The network is not considered a superior
organizational mode to replace bureaucratic structures; the business network has
always coexisted with bureaucracy, and it is an empirical question which is most
essential in a specific case. The network important to the subsidiary comprises not
only  business relationships with  external  actors but also  with  the  whole  network
including other corporate units.
According to the product mandate literature, three variables are particularly im-
portant in classifying subsidiary roles: own production, export and  control of
development resources. Thus, production subsidiaries can divided into four groups, as
shown in the matrix below.
Fig: Classification of production subsidiaries
(Forsgren and Pedersen, 1998).
The local supplier produces for the local market, while  the international supplier is
allowed to sell outside the local market, but in both cases the products are developed
elsewhere in the MNC. Both the product mandate and the local developer have their
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From a network point of view, another factor becomes important in deciding whether
a subsidiary can be classified as a centre of excellence or not: the degree of corporate
and  external embeddedness of the subsidiary in terms of R&D. The degree of
embeddedness reflects the intensity of knowledge exchange between the subsidiary
and  other corporate units and  external business actors. If a subsidiary has a high
degree of both corporate and external embeddedness, it is well integrated in both the
internal and external network, which gives the subsidiary  a prominent position within
the MNC.
Forsgren and Pedersen conclude that interdependence rather than autonomy is the
crucial variable when  assessing whether a subsidiary is a centre of excellence.
Product mandate is a necessary but not sufficient condition; to be regarded as a a
centre of excellence, a subsidiary also must have a certain degree of corporate
embeddedness. Finally, a subsidiary with a high degree of both corporate and external
embeddedness can be of specific strategic importance to the MNC.
In a study of foreign-owned firms in Sweden, Birkinshaw (1998) examines subsidiary
development from a host country perspective. In contrast to most approaches where
the subsidiary either adapt to (Ghoshal and Nohria, 1989) or tap into or draw from the
host country environment (Porter, 1990), the subsidiary is seen as a contributor to
the host country environment.
The research focuses on the impact of the process of subsidiary development on the
host country. A reason for the selection of Sweden is the interesting situation of a
recent political acceptance of foreign direct investment and a rapidly increasing level
of foreign ownership in the industrial sector. The subsidiaries studied extend from very
large, acquired firms such as ABB and  Saab  with a major impact on the  Swedish
economy to small sales subsidiaries with very limited job creation or investment.
Fig: Stages in subsidiary development (Birkinshaw, 1998).
The figure illustrates different stages of subsidiary development with respect to level
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The sales subsidiary, simply selling the parent company’s products or services in the
local market, represents the first stage and lowest level of value-added. In the second
stage, the local sales and  manufacturing subsidiary also undertakes production for
the local market. The regional hub subsidiary in the third stage has a certain amount
of international responsibility, typically export to neighbour countries or marketing in
a region, such as Scandinavia. Finally, the world product mandate subsidiary provides
the highest level of value-added, typically having R&D, manufacturing and  manage-
ment activities for an entire business or division.
The level of subsidiary value-added is also dependent on the relationship with the host
country economy. The  sales  subsidiary provides limited  local  employment and
investment,  while  the  world  product mandate subsidiary provides high  levels of
employment and investment, i.e., low-value added  subsidiaries are ‘exploiters’ of the
local environment, whereas high-value added  subsidiaries are ‘contributors’ to the
local environment.
The subsidiary development process is by no means given and definite; many sub-
sidiaries will remain in a certain stage, and some may move backwards. The process
develops in a complex interplay between the actions of subsidiary managers, the
actions of parent company managers and  the  characteristics of the local
marketplace. While parent-driven development is a top-down process, where decisions
about investments and new responsibilities are made by the headoffice, subsidiary-
driven development is a bottom-up, entrepreneurial process, where the initiatives to
exploit new business opportunities are taken by subsidiary managers.
In his study of foreign-owned subsidiaries in Sweden, Birkinshaw found that centres of
excellence could be gained at every stage of the value chain, from R&D to sales and
services. Centres of excellence, defined as an area of expertise for which the
subsidiary is recognized by the corporation and  which  other units draw on, do not
represent major investments by the parent company but show that the subsidiary is
successful in at least one area, being good for the parent company as well as the
Swedish economy. Birkinshaw suggests that the Swedish centre of excellence model
may be a part of an emerging trend and states:
”If, as some claim, we are moving to a world where  knowledge management is
imperative to success, then centres of excellence will become a much more common
phenomenon because they represent the wellsprings of knowledge on which others draw.”
(1998, p. 291)
Birkinshaw concludes that the subsidiary development process varies significantly
from country to country; in Sweden it is less established than in other countries, such
as Canada and UK. The strong manufacturing development in Ireland and Scotland is
not evident in Sweden; nor is the emergence of world  product mandates, frequently
seen in Canada and USA. One reason for this is the small, peripheral and relatively
high-cost market, only recently being a part of the European Union. Consequently,
most foreign MNCs see Sweden as a market for their products but not as a suitable
site for manufacturing or development. Another reason is the for a long time neutral
or even averse attitude towards foreign direct investment.45
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